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[L. A. 20375. In Bank. Dee. 15, 1948.]

MARY DI CORPO, Appellant, v. MICHELE D1 CORPO,
Respondent.
[1] Executions - Issuance - After Five Years - Diligence.- To
authorize the issuance of .execution under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ C85, with respect to unpaid installments for support money
that have accrued more than five yt.ars !fter entry of a di"_
vorce decree, a judgment creditor must show that he has
exercised due diligence during the five-year period in attempting to locate property owned by the debtor. Even though
the court is satisfied as to diligence in this respect, it may
denY' its process if the debtor shows circumstances occurring
subsequent to the five-year period upon which, in the exercise
of a sOund discretion, it should conclude that the creditor
is not now entitled to collect his judgment.
[2] Id.- Issuance - After Five Years - Discretion of Oonrt.Whether a judgment creditor seeking to enforce his judgment
more than five years after its entry exercised due diligence
~':
in attempting to locate property owned by the debtor, ;'.1 for
the trial court to dete~ine in its discretion, and its determination will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion.
[1] See 5 Oal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. (1944 Rev.) 759.
[2] See 11 Oal.Jur. 44; 21 Am.Jur. 31.
KcK. Dig. References: [1,4] Executions, § 21.1; [2, 3] Executions, § 23(3); [5] Executions, 112; ~6, 7] Executions, 134.
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[3] Id.-Issuance-After Five Years-Discretion of Court.-It was
not an abuse of discretion to deny a divorced wife's motion for
issuance of execution under Cot.e Civ. Proc., § 685, to enforce
a judgment for support money, where she failed to set fortb
facts from which the court might conclude that she had
exercised due Jilige:Jce in locating defendant's property, where
she admitted that she took no steps to collect the judgment
after legal advice that she could not collect it unless defendant
had an income, and where it appeared that defendant owned
realty in the county more than five years before such relief
was sought.
[4] Id. - I::nance - After Tive Years - Diligence. - A divorced
wife's diligence or want thereof in enforcing an unpaid judgment for support money for the children awarded to her is
determinative of the question of her right to issUllDce of
execution under Code Civ. Proc., § 685, more than five years
after entry of the judgment.
[6] Id.-Issuance-Within Five Yeara.-Where a judgment is
payable in installments, a writ of execution will issue und<>r
Code Civ. Proc., § 681, as a matter of right on installments
accruing within the five-year period on an ex parte apI,liea tion
by the judgment creditor merely showing that such installments
remain unpaid.
[6] Id.-Quashing-Burden of Proof.-On motion to recall an
execution issued on a divorce decree ordering payment of
support money for minor children, where the wife has produced proof that installments payable under the decree had
accrued within five years, the burden is on the defendant to
establish facts justifying an order recalling the writ.
[7] Id.-Quashing-Evidence.-A judgment debtor did not make
a sufficient showing justifying the recalling of a writ of
execution to enforce payment of installmentll of support
money for minor children that accrued within five years after
judgment, notwithstanc:ng his affidavit that the children were
capable of earuing their own support and that, in view of
an injury to his back, he was unable to work and support
himself, where the fact that his home had been unencumbered
for several years showed that since his injury he had had
other means of supporting himself, and where he was enabled
to acquire the property by disregarding his obligation to
support the children.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County denying issuance of a writ of execution under Code
Civ. Proc., § 685, and recalling an execution previously issued.
Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. First order affirmed; second
order reversed.
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Krag " Sweet and David T. Sweet for Appellant.
W .. H. Sullivan and Kenneth K. Seott lor Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On April 2, 1931, pursuant to an order

to show cause for temporary support in a divorce action.
defendant was ordered to pay plaintiif court cOsta and
attorney's fees and $12.50 per week for her support and the
support of their two children. On April 27, 1932, plaintift
, obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce, which awarded
her custody of the children and ordered defendant to pay
her $40 per month for their support and maintenance until
further order of the court.
" In June, 1947, plainti1f moved for the issuance of execution
against defendant under section 685 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to recover the unpaid balance due under the order
pendente lite and the installments of $40 per month due
under the interlocutory decree from April 27, 1932, to May
29, 1942. This motion was denied by order entered July 11,
1947. Upon motion of defendant, an order was entered
July 21, 1947, recalling an execution previously issued pursuant to section 681 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
installments that accrued during the five-year period immediately last past. Plainti1f appeals from both orders.
'In her affidavit supporting her motion for the issuance
'of execution under section 685, plainti1f alleged that $5,361
remains unpaid, that she "has been unable prior to this time
to find any property of the defendant in this State which
might be applied to the satisfaction of this judgment; that
: more than five years have elapsed since the entry of said
.judgment; that there is now in this State property of the
, defendant subject to execution whieh may be seized to satisfy
't,hia judgment."
I
. , . , '
i • Defendant filed an aftldavit in opposition to the motion
alleging that he paid $306.50 pursuant to the order pendente
lite; that subsequently the order to show cause was removed
, from the calendar; that on July 21, 1931, he and plainti1f
through their attorneys entered into a stipulation in which
,he agreed to withdraw his answer filed in the divorce action
and to allow plainti1f to obtain judgment by default; that on
same day he and plaintHf entered into a property settle•jDent, by which he agreed to convey all of his interest in the
property to her and she qreed to siva him •
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f'redit of $2,200 on account of installm('nts due 'lr t() beeonl'
.hl!' by virtue of t.ht' order'pl'ndente litll; and tlHtt hC' \'ouvcypd
all of his interest in the community property pursuant to
such agreement.
He then alleged that from July 21, 1931, until May 12,
1947, she made no demands on him for payment of accrued
installments, although for a number of years after the execution of the agreement" defendant operated a bakery wagon in
the vicinity where plaintiff resided, and sold bakery products
on the same street on which plaintiff was residing, and on
numerous occasions, .. defendant went to plaintiff's home
and asked her to let him see his children, but she would in
each instance refuse him admittance to her home, and defendant would only get to see his children at such intervals when
they would be playing with other children on the side-walk
or in the street"; that although he had been informed many
years ago that plaintiff had remarried, he had no knowledge
of the interlocutory decree of divorce ordering him to pay $40
per month for the support of the children, since no copy or
notice of such an order was ever served on him. Defendant
further alleged that on June 11, 1941, he purchased a fiveroom house, which was then free of encumbrance and valued
at approximately $5,000, and is now worth $8,000; and that
his deed to this property has been duly recorded in Los
Angeles County, and the property has been assessed in his
name on the county tax rolls since 1941.
His affidavit finally states that "failure for more than
fifteen (15) years last past to issue or attempt to have execution issued, has greatly prejudiced the rights of this defendant in, that if the plaintiff . . . [had] pressed this defendant
for payment, or even caused citation to show cause ilJ_con~
tempt proceedings to be issued against this defendant, this
defendant would no doubt have made arrangements to pay
any delinquencies in monthly installments, but now after he
has worked hard for many years last past to accumulate his
home, the property heretofore described, and by reason of
the fact that some months ago he sustained a severe injury
to his back, and is unable to work, to issue and enforce execution against his home, would work great hardship upon him,
and would amount to confiscation of his said home. . . . that
at the time he entered into the aforesaid property settlement
on said 21st day of July, 1931, he had only been in the United
States from Italy a few years, and at said time did not understand or speak English very well, and when he entered into
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said settlement, and on the same day conveyed all of his title
and interest in the community property, he believed that said
conveyance was in settlement of all claims of the plaintiff
for support and maintenance. "
In a counteraffidavit plaintiff alleged that defendant discontinued the operation of the bakery route before the entry
of the interlocutory decree of divorce; that he thereafter
stated to her that he had no money with which to support
the children; that between defendant's discontinuance of
the bakery route and sometime in 1946 she was unaware of
the location of his residence or of any property owned by
him; that in 1933 she consulted a deputy district attorney of
Los Angeles County, who advised her that she would not be
able to collect the unpaid installments from defendant unless
she could prove that he had an income; and that in reliance
upon such advice she did nothing further to satisfy the judgment. She also alleged that in 1944 defendant visited the
home of one :M:illi Costa, to whom he stated that he wanted
to know where plaintiff and the children were living so that
he might contribute to their support. Finally, she alleged
that she did not recall signing a property settlement agreement, but admitted receiving the property that defendant
alleged was conveyed to her by virtue of such agreement.
The property settlement agreement introduced into evidence
reveals that it was not signed by either plaintiff or defendant.
. [1] Section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"In all cases the judgment may be enforced or carried into
execution after the lapse of five years from the date of its
entry, by leave of the co~rt, upon motion, and after due
notice to the judgment debtor accompanied by an affidavit or
'affidavits setting forth the reasons for failure to proceed in
. compliance with the provisions of section 681 of this code. The
failure to set forth such reasons as shall, in the discretion
. of the court. be sufficient, shall be ground for the denial of
the motion." With respect to installments that have accrued
:'Dlore than five years a judgment creditor must show that he
has exercised due diligence during the five-year period in
~attempting to locate property owned by the debtor. (Lohman
Y; Lohman, 29 Ca1.2d 144, 148-149 [173 P.2d 6571; Butcher
~;.Brouwer, 21 Cal.2d 354, 358 [132 P.2d 205J j Beccuti v.
;'f!olombo Baking 00., 21 Ca1.2d 360, 363 [132 P.2d 2071;
'Hatch v. Oalkins, 21 Cal.2d 364 [132 P.2d 210] ; Atkinson v.
fA.tkinson, 35 Cal.App.2d 705, 707 [96 P.2d 824].) "And
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even though the creditor may have satisfied the court that he
has proceeded with due diligence to enforce his judgment
under section 681, the court may still deny him its process if
the debtor shows circumstances occurring subsequent to the
five-year period upon which, in the exercise of a sound discretion, it should conclude that he is not now entitled to
collect his judgment." (Butcher v. Brouwer, supra, 21 Ca1.2t1
354, 358.) [2] Whether or not a creditor has exercist'd
due diligence is for the trial court to determine in its d iscretion, and its determination will not be disturbed in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion. (John P. Mills Org. v.
Shawmut Oorp., 29 Cal.2d 863, 865 [179 P.2d 570] j Beccuti
v. Oolombo Baking 00., npra, 21 Cal.2d 360, 363 j Atkinson
v. Atkinson, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d 705, 707; llc016lland v.
Shaw, 23 Cal.App.2d 107, 109 [72 P.2d 225].)
[3] The question arises, therefore, whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denyng the motion for the issuance
of execution as to installments that have accrued more than
five years from the date of the motion. Although plaintiff
alleged that "she has been unable . . . to find any property
of the defendant," her affidavits do not show what efforts
were made to determine where defendant lived after 1932 or
to locate any property owned by him. She has failed to set
forth facts from which the trial court might conclude that
she had exercised due diligence in locating defendant's property. She admits that she took no further steps to collect
the judgment after a deputy district attorney advised her
that she could not collect it unless defendant had an income.
Upon the basia of this advice she should have made investigations to determine whether defendant had any income or
property. Moreover, as appears from defendant's affidavit,
he has owned real property in Los Angeles County since
1941. It has been assessed in his name since that date, and
an examination of the tax assessor's records would have
disclosed his ownership thereof.
[4] Plaintiff contends that the children should not be
punished because of her lack of diligence. Since, however, she
has presumably supported the children out of her own funds
since 1931, she is seeking, not funds for the current support
of the children, but reimbursement for funds she has already
expended for their support. (See Saunders v. Simms, 183
Cal. 167, 171 [190 P. 806].) Her lack of diligence in enforcing
is determinative. (See Oot"Jr.rane v.
. the unpaid judgment
.
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Cochrane, 57 Cal.App.2d 937, 939 [135 P.2d 714] i Shields
v. Shields, 55 Cal.App.2d 579, 583 [130 P.2d 982] i McNa~b
v. McNabb, 47 Cal.App.2d 623, 627 [118 P.2d 869} i Radonich
v. Radonich, 130 Cal.App. 250,255 [20 P.2d 51].)
[5] The right to obtain execution upon installmenu that
have accrued within five years of the date of the application
for the writ is governed by section 681 of the Code of Civil
, Procedure, and rests upon different principles. This section
r' provides: "The party in whose favor judgment is given may,
, at any time within five years after the entry thereof, have a
writ of execution issued for its enforcement." A writ of exccutioa will issue under the foregoing section as a matter of
right upon installments accruing within the five-year period
on an ex parte application by the judgment creditor, merely:
showing that such installments remain unpaid. (Wolfe v.
Wolfe, 30 Ca1.2d 1, 4 [180 P.2d 345] ; Lohma. v. Lohman,
IUpra,29 CaUd 144, 150.)
~
[6] Thus, upon proof by plaintiJf that installment!' hAve
, accrued within five years, the burden was upon defcnd:mt to
establish facts justifying an order recalling the writ. [7] We
have concluded that defendant did not make a su.t1icient shnwing entitling him to recall the writ 'of execution upon inst.'lllments in the amount of $2,400, which have accrued within
five years. In his affidavit in support of the motion for the
recall of execution he made allegations substantially simil'lr
to those contained in his affidavit in opposition to phlintifl'~
motion under section 685,. :a;e ah.!o alleged that the children
.' are boys, aged 17 and 18, and are capable" of earning their own
support, and that in view of the injury to his,back he is unllble
, ,t9, work and support himself, and that to permit execution on
,,hiS home would compel him to become a public, ch:u-tre of
" ~e county and stat".
" ~. The fact that his home, currently valued at $8,000, or $5,600
, 'mOre than the amount of the accrued installmenbJ for which
the writ issued, has been unencumbered since 1941 shows
Clearly that since his injury he bas nad other mean, of sup, Porting himself. Defendant contends that to compel him to
!~ender a part of the property that he has acquired after
many years of hard work will be highly inequitable. He: WIUJ
able; to acquire this property, however, by' disrettardine' his
obligation to support his children 80 that the burden of their:
support fell upon plaintiJI.
'." ,
The order denying the motion for the isSuance of execution
to lection 685 is affirmed. The order granting
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defendant's motion to recall execution issued pursuant to
section 681 is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the first order
but dissent from the reversal of the second. It appears to me
that the District Court of Appeal correctly determined, under
the majority view in Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Ca1.2d 144 [173
P.2d 657J, that the trial court was justified in recalling the
writ of execution previously issued (Di Corpo v. Di Corpo, 85
A.C.A. 728, 193 P.2d 963) ; but in any event, I still adhere
to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in the
Lohman case. I do not believe that plaintiff was entitled as
a matter of right to the issuance of execution in 1947, for
any alleged unpaid installments which may have accrued
upon the interlocutory decree which was entered in 1932.
On the contrary, I believe that the question of whether execution should have issued and the question of whether the writ
of execution previously issued should have been recalled
were matters within the discretion of the trial court. In my
opinion, both orders should be affirmed as the record shows no
abuse of discretion.
Schauer, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 20562.

In Bank.

Dec. 15, 1948.]

Estate of JOHN! C. FERRALL, Deceased. ALEX C.
HAMILTON, as Guardian, etc., Respondent, v. BANK
OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION et aI., as Co trustees, etc., Appellants.
[1] Trusts-Actions and Proceedings-Appeal.-An order directing testamentary trustees to pay a beneficiary a designated
sum per month from the income and corpus of the trust until
further order of court, is appeaiabie under Prob. Code, § 1240,
as an order "instructing . . . a trustee!'
[2] Id.-Actions and Proceedings-Appeal.-Testamentary trustees may appeal fro:n a probate court order directing increased
[1] See 25 Oal.Jur. 354; 54 Am.Jur. 490.
licK. Dig. Reference: [1,2] Trusts, ~ 371.
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